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Abstract
In this article, I argue that values are fluid societal expectations which cannot be 
used as normative foundations of modern society. Despite their transcendental valid-
ity claims, they operate as immanent tools of the normalisation of societal power 
and contribute to the transformation of potentia of societal forces to the constitu-
tional auctoritas. I subsequently argue that a sociology of constitutional values must 
address the distinction between moral values in law and law as a moral value. Con-
stitutional processes of the transvaluation of values are complex forms of societal 
expectations in which understanding, consensus and conformity must be taken into 
account as much as confusion, dissent and deviance. I conclude by claiming that 
constitutional valuations and transvaluations need to be explained as part of the legal 
and political self-referentiality unlimited by nation-states and stretching into con-
temporary supranational and transnational regimes of law and their internal value 
productions.
The first time that I met Martin Krygier was at a conference at the Central Euro-
pean University in Budapest in the 1990s. At that time, Central Europe was full 
of liberal and democratic hopes associated with the rule of law transformations in 
which Martin was one of the leading world scholars. The Visegrád group was the 
name given to young aspiring democracies joining forces to become members of the 
newly founded European Union and we, young academics from the region, wanted 
to be part of this process and its forces. And, indeed, the university in Budapest was 
still unthreatened by authoritarian government and was not forced to move its activi-
ties to Vienna. One is almost tempted to nostalgically think that those were the best 
times of post-communist societies in Central Europe then investing so much effort 
and energy in constitution-making and democracy-building and inviting the most 





distinguished minds to be part of this process without being labelled as agents of 
some dark powers threatening local traditions and identities.
For me, meeting Martin was certainly one of the best things that happened in my 
academic and personal life. I was immediately taken by his irony and intelligence 
which always shone in his eyes. One could immediately tell that this was not one 
of those ‘experts’ presenting superficial knowledge but a typical Central European 
intellectual whose thinking is his life. When, many years later, I was invited by Mar-
tin to a book launch in the Bondi Pavilion in Sydney, I could see how he managed 
to keep this Central European style of thinking and cultural tradition in his Austral-
ian homeland and how much he was loved and respected for that by everyone in the 
crowd gathering that evening.
Martin has a rare capacity of clear and original writing in different registers from 
cultivated and entertaining essays to the most advanced academic studies. Whenever 
he writes or speaks, I carefully read or attentively listen already knowing that my 
own ways of thinking and views will be profoundly affected by his thoughts and 
arguments. Whenever we meet and discuss matters of the rule of law, social values 
or constitutionalism and democracy, I admire his ability to express serious ideas in a 
light and enlightening spirit. The following text is inspired by these discussions and 
encounters for which I am grateful to my dear friend Martin Krygier.
1  Introductory Remarks
In modern society, lawyers in general and constitutionalists in particular often take 
on the role of theologians and prescribe the moral and societal unity of values and 
principles despite the fact that their operations are constrained by the functionally 
differentiated system of positive law. Legal theorists appropriate this role by turning 
theoretical knowledge into a legitimation tool of the positive law system. They want 
to believe that their theoretical transvaluation of legal and political values will lead 
to practical policy changes in the system of positive law.
Modern society is functionally differentiated, systemically pluralistic and poly-
valent because each social system produces its own values. These values are inter-
nally constituted by different systems, yet they also claim an external application 
and objective validity and expand into other social systems.
In the context of positive law, it is then considered a specific task of legal the-
ory and jurisprudence to facilitate arguments and reasoning for the specific legal 
enforcement of allegedly general moral values. A sociology of constitutionalism, 
therefore, has to theoretically explain and contextualise this legal transvaluation of 
moral values in contemporary constitutional law within and beyond the nation state.
2  From Societal Foundations to Systemic Fluidity
While the transvaluation of values and their change can be evaluated and referred to 
as good or bad in themselves, there is a more general problem with values as soci-
etal foundations and guardians of cultural integration which needs to be addressed 
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at the beginning of this brief analysis of constitutional values. It is closely related 
to the modernisation of society and was already described by Emile Durkheim as 
anomie—a loss of values and meaningful existence which can only be described as 
bad and considered to be a symptom of the crisis of modern society and humanity.
Anomie is the negative absolute because it is always bad and cannot be contex-
tually evaluated as good or bad for society and individuals. Durkheim’s warning 
against the damaging consequences of modern anomie are matched by the Marxist 
revolutionary promises to save humanity from its alienation in capitalist society or 
conservative lamentations of the cultural crisis echoing Oswald Spengler’s ‘decline 
of the West’. Durkheim’s theory of modernity as the permanent crisis of values and 
meaning thus represents a sociological response to the evergreen theme of the crisis 
of European civilisation addressed by so many philosophers, political leaders, mor-
alists and ideologues of all kinds and colours.
Learning from Durkheim’s theory of anomie and other sociological and moralist 
critiques of the decline and absence of values, it is then possible to state that moral 
principles and values are expected to operate as society’s foundations and reservoirs 
of meaningful social existence. However, the very process of their transvaluation 
turns them into fluid expectations of what is considered socially valuable and can 
be challenged by individuals and groups but only with great societal risks of being 
labelled as bad people or communities.
Values are expected to embed society in the order of good and thus guarantee 
and justify their meaningful existence. Nevertheless, every value, rather than oper-
ating as a solid fundament of societal institutions and their ultimate point of refer-
ence, is an outcome of societal evolution. Society thus permanently and immanently 
constitutes its values which, paradoxically, are expected to be its transcendental 
foundations.
Societal values, including those operating in the system of positive law, borrow 
the distinction between good and bad from the system of religion. In the same way, 
values also draw on the religious distinction between transcendence and immanence 
and thus respond to the specific call for the meaningful existence of the universe and 
human life. They paradoxically promise universal validity in specific social condi-
tions and thus stabilise functionally differentiated society through its imaginary of 
moral unity.
Modern society cannot exist without values and their imaginaries, yet these can-
not guarantee its existence and evolution. Values make sense, not foundations. Soci-
ety cannot be organised in the Parsonsian theoretical imagination as a culturally 
integrated system of values because it is typical of both the abundance and absence 
of moral values and ethics which are invoked every time there is a problem of social 
steering in different systems, such as ‘business ethics’, ‘corporate social responsibil-
ity’, ‘environmental ethics’, ‘bioethics’, etc.
Furthermore, values are expected to deal with societal risks, yet they also bring 
new risks, conflicts, and moral panic. They therefore cannot function as invariant 
structures of system maintenance. Instead of culturally stabilising the social system, 
they are contingently constituted as part of the system’s evolution.
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3  Societal Power of Normalisation: On Potentia in Values and Their 
Legal Constitutionalisations
Values are rooted in a metaphysical search for the meaning of our existence and 
position in the world. Their justification, therefore, is not a matter of mere morality. 
Their genealogy is impossible to exclusively explain in terms of validity and restric-
tive normativity. They are productive and demonstrate the potentia of human activ-
ity and societal evolution.
Values are tools of the normalisation of societal power. While societal norms 
restrict the possibilities of social action, values increase it as experiences of ‘cer-
tainty independent of cognitive arguments’ (Jonas 2000).1 Instead of defining consti-
tutive moral duties, values establish different degrees of the desirability and meaning 
of human action between good and bad. The highest goal of modern individuation, 
therefore, is possible to harmonise with a social utopia of valuable social existence.
Values are pervasive in all social systems despite their lack of institutional for-
malisation, enforcement and self-reference through official authorisation. Judges and 
other legal officials claim to be their guardians as much as guardians of legality, yet 
the question of the origins and genealogy of values can hardly be answered by their 
legal authority. A belief that values should be justified and publicly discussed and 
legitimised in society does not mean that this society actually constitutes its values 
through justification and deliberation.
In the specific context of constitutional law and theory, foundational values are 
codified by legal constitutions and even receive full doctrinal support, yet which 
general values are going to be enforced as constitutive and legally binding depends 
on specific court judgements, executive decisions and legislative acts. The theoreti-
cal conflict between originalists and organicists (Ackermann 2007) is obviously not 
just a conflict of values or another example of the paradigmatic tension between 
formalist and realist jurisprudence (Tamanaha 2010).2 It covers the most general 
issues of the legal method of the interpretation and application of norms (Kennedy 
1998). Nevertheless, it also shows the paradoxical legal operationalisation of values 
as prescriptive constitutional foundations despite their factual societal fluidity and 
contingency.
Constitutional originalists insist that constituent values and meaning had been 
formulated at the moment of constitution-making and the law’s principal job is to 
preserve them despite knowing that any such retrospective interpretations are just a 
matter of speculation about the original understanding of the text by its authors and 
members of the respective constitutional polity at the time of its making.
Against this view, advocates of constitutional activism adopt the sociological 
concept of ‘the living constitution’  (Ackermann 2007)3 to argue that the constitu-
tion’s text has to be interpreted in the context of the present times, values, meanings 
and intentions. The living present establishes what is constitutionally viable and val-
uable while the past is declared the dead-letter law. Activists thus enforce absolute 
1 See, for instance, Jonas 2000.
2 See Tamanaha (2010).
3 Ackerman, supra n. 2.
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constitutional values and normative frameworks despite accepting the relativist view 
that future generations of lawyers, judges and citizens can invalidate them if differ-
ent values and principles start evolving and prevailing in the living constitution.
The genealogy of values escapes the constraints of legal and political communi-
cation and cannot be left to either judges or politicians pretending to act as a moral 
compass of society as a whole. The valuing subject has to recognise the social fact 
that the genealogy of values is a matter of historical and societal contingency. Fur-
thermore, there is no escape from the self-referential question of the value of the 
valuation of societal facts, and the distinction between their good and bad nature, 
and the transvaluation of values itself.
4  The Negative Value of the Rule of Law and Constitutional Authority
Understanding the process of the transvaluation of constitutional values as the nor-
malisation of societal power requires a basic distinction to be made between external 
values legitimising legality and a specific societal value of legality and the rule of 
law itself. While general values, such as human dignity, equality, decency and public 
safety, operate as substantive tools of the legitimation of law, legality itself repre-
sents a specific version of both the valuable public and private life which, apart from 
procedural and technical values of impartiality, generality, predictability and clarity, 
involves the force of neutralising moral conflicts and their explosive potential. Any 
sociological dealing with constitutional values must therefore address the distinction 
between moral values in law and law as a moral value.
While criticising metaphysical notions of the rule of law as a societal immanent 
vehicle of the transcendental ideal of justice, legal positivists typically argue that the 
rule of law’s value is primarily negative because it consists of the capacity to avoid 
the risk of arbitrary power. For instance, Joseph Raz states that the rule of law is 
not a carrier of good and can only avoid evil including in the form of law’s societal 
expansion which involves the paradoxical risk of arbitrariness in legal norms them-
selves (Raz 2009).4
This negative value of the rule of law as a technique of the self-containment and 
self-restraint of law in society has its specific operationalization in the subsystem 
of constitutional law. Legal constitutions typically maximise the social efficiency of 
positive law and politics by separating them from each other as well as from their 
societal environment, such as the economy, science, religion and morality. Achiev-
ing this goal requires separating the legal constitution from appeals to higher tran-
scendental principles and their replacement by the procedures self-validation and 
self-foundation.
This paradox of the self-validation of ‘law as law through law’5 constitutes author-
ity (auctoritas) referring to the legal and political systems, yet it is impossible to 
4 Joseph Raz speaks of both the value and virtue of the rule of law. See Raz (2009).
5 Rudolf Wiethölter’s expression, quoted in Frankenberg, G (2003) Autorität und Integration: Zur Gram-
matik von Recht und Verfassung. Frankfurt. Suhrkamp, p. 7.
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extend beyond the limitations of these systems. Constitutional authority can hardly 
prescribe the conditions of the scientific truth or aesthetic beauty unless the legal 
constitution refers to utopian or dystopian societies.
Constitutional authority, therefore, is not the ultimate social self which could be 
constituted by society itself and guarantee its political sovereignty. In constitutional 
democratic societies, the sovereign people constituted by the sovereign legal docu-
ment is always already de-substantialised and diluted into legislated competences 
and the limitations of power and decision-making procedures of different constitu-
tional bodies.
The collective self is a matter of legal and political systemic self-description and 
self-reference and cannot be identified as the supreme leader and subject of the total-
ity of social life. Law provides politics with legitimacy and receives enforcement 
in this constitutional exchange of communication. Law’s authority thus depends 
on its dual capacity as politics’ rational modus significandi and modus operandi. In 
return, it achieves the necessary support from the political system in the form of 
enforcement.
This capacity of self-programming positive law and constitutions through both 
legal rationality and political force is not limited by the nation state’s institutions and 
the referential framework of sovereignty as it affects political and legal institutions 
in the post-sovereign societal condition, such as the EU. However, this capacity does 
not justify hasty conclusions regarding the legal and political possibility to integrate 
the multiplicity and plurality of globalised societies and cultures. Cultural plurali-
ties and differences as well as heterogeneity can hardly be overcome by some kind 
of total societal ‘self’—polity ultimately constituting our global society in terms of 
universal morality and cosmopolitan values.
5  Towards a Sociology of Constitutional Values
If values are tools of the normalisation of power in society, a sociology of constitu-
tionalism must move beyond legal theoretical and jurisprudential questions of how 
political power becomes controlled by law and how law becomes legitimised by 
external values. It rather needs to ask how societal power constitutes the systems of 
positive law and politics. The problem of constitutional power ceases to be associ-
ated with political control and legal limitation. It is reformulated as a problem of the 
societal constitution and transformation of the potentia of multiple societal forces 
into generally recognised and operating authority—auctoritas.
This process of transforming the potentia of societal forces and imaginaries into 
the potestas of politics and the auctoritas of law requires a sociological and social 
theoretical response to the juridical question of ultimate legal force and the political 
question of sovereign power. A sociology of constitutionalism must subsequently 
analyse more general non-political and non-legal processes of self-constitutions of 
modern society including constituent powers behind self-validating legitimation 
procedures of the systems of positive law and politics.
A number of legal and constitutional theories can be considered as prescriptive 
specialist attempts at resolving the current crisis of reason, civilisation, politics and 
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human values including those legislated for by political constitutions. They typically 
invoke moral principles and foundational values and thus illuminate the function of 
values in law as much as the value of legality itself. They draw on a general phil-
osophical critique of positivism that the background knowledge and values of the 
researcher cannot be eliminated and actually constitute the object of research. This 
legal theoretical and jurisprudential recourse to the external validation of law by 
philosophical speculation and the anthropological interpretation of values and politi-
cal ethics calls for a sociological inquiry itself.
First, the theoretical dynamics between the self-validation and external valida-
tion of law requires introducing the sociological distinction between ‘front-line’ and 
‘second-line’ legal knowledge. While front-line knowledge is an operative condi-
tion of the system of positive law and its different segments define different legal 
professions within the system, the second-line knowledge of legal theory offers a 
self-description of the system of positive law ‘as it should be’. This internal legal 
distinction between front-line and second-line knowledge can subsequently be ana-
lysed from the external sociological perspective which also allows for a theoreti-
cal observation of legal theories and theorists as leaders of legal reforms and social 
policy-makers, if not ideologues of moral transformations of their polities.
Second, a sociological inquiry into constitutional values and positive law sub-
sequently requires one to externally observe not only legal normativity but also all 
non-positive political, moral, economic, scientific, technological and all other soci-
etal normative interventions in the system of positive law and legal doctrines or 
jurisprudence (Luhmann 2004). A sociological theory of constitutional norms and 
values must involve a study of distinctions and conceptualisations of law as a system 
distinguishing between the right and wrong human conduct and constituted by indi-
viduals as ‘norm-users’ (MacCormick 2007) in their interaction and intersubjective 
recognition of normative patterns.
This sociological theory needs to move beyond explanations of the distinction 
between the spontaneity of societal normative orders and the formality of officially 
authorised legal institutions which describe individuals as interacting morally auton-
omous subjects constituting such orders in their ordinary practical life. Instead, this 
theory has to address these forms of intersubjective experiences and understanding 
as more complex forms of societal expectations of conduct in which understanding, 
consensus and conformity must be taken into account as much as confusion, dissent 
and deviance.
Third, this theoretical shift requires abandoning the concept of the constitution as 
a consensually grounded and gradually evolving document empowered and enforced 
by the collective will of the people as its constituent subject. Although it is true 
that constitutions become more stable if they last for a longer period of time, their 
legitimacy does not necessarily increase with the passage of historical time turn-
ing them from fresh political documents into shared societal traditions. Constitu-
tional traditions can be considered illegitimate as much as utopian projects of future 
constitution-making.
Instead of turning societal consensus and dissent into absolute values and exclu-
sive procedures of legitimation, it is the opposition and difference between con-
sensus and dissent that drives societal evolution and, apart from other societal 
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semantics, defines the operative possibilities and legitimation potential of the sys-
tems of positive law and politics (Niklas Luhmann 1995).6 There is no privilege for 
either consensus or dissent politics and no political or constitutional subject can be 
expected to evolve out of them. There is no chance to return to anthropological, eth-
nocentric and logocentric politics of overlapping or any other consensus as much as 
it is useless to romanticise the heroic struggle of dissidents in any political regimes 
with or without the rule of law. Issues of legitimation rather have to be addressed 
against the background of the consensus/dissent distinction.
6  Concluding Remarks: On the Societal Paradoxes of Constitutional 
Values
Constitutions are not the Hartian ultimate rules of recognition setting the criteria for the 
validity of positive law on the basis of the societal (and therefore the factual) acknowl-
edgement of the expectations of the legal system’s officials. Their mutual understand-
ing, acceptance of conduct and even dialogue cannot resolve the basic question of the 
authority, power and enforcement of legal norms. As Neil MacCormick observed, the 
ultimate constitutional rule of recognition is closer to Kelsen’s basic norm than Hart’s 
rule of recognition.7
In light of these jurisprudential reflections of constitutional rules and values and 
with indispensable help from social and sociological theories of law, the political con-
stitution can be paradoxically described as the customary basic norm validated by both 
spontaneous evolution and deliberative collective will-formation. Other paradoxes of 
constitutionalism drawing on the distinction between constituent and constituted power 
are also well covered by theories of constitutionalism and assisted by the sociological, 
anthropological and ethnographic perspectives of constitutional law. For instance, citi-
zens constitute the people as constituent power, but citizenship needs to be codified by 
the constitution. The state’s constituent power of the sovereign people must be repre-
sented by state bodies to achieve its sovereignty. Nations are considered to be real exist-
ing social and political units, yet they do not exist as sovereign entities until the socially 
constructed legal constitution brings them into their existence, and so on.
All these paradoxes are conceptualised by constitutional theories and philosophies, 
yet they also need to be sociologically explained as part of the legal and political self-
referentiality that is unlimited by nation states and stretching into contemporary supra-
national and transnational regimes of law and their internal value productions.
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7 MacCormick, supra n. 9, p. 57.
6 For general comments on the opposition between consensus and dissent, see Niklas Luhmann (1995).
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